Fwd: HISTORY LESSON

Conrad Hoffsommer hoffsoco@martin.luther.edu
Tue, 18 Nov 2003 10:00:07 -0600


>Delivered-To: philbondi.com-MPT@philbondi.com
>From: "Les Smith" <lessmith@buffnet.net>
>To: "MPT" <MPT@philbondi.com>
>Subject: HISTORY LESSON
>Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2003 03:59:09 -0000
>X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 4.72.3110.1
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>HISTORY LESSON
>by
>Les Smith
>
>
>To "Gina" Carter
>
>For naught escapes the wares time has to vend,
>And all that has a start must have an end.
>
>
>******
>
>
>Some time ago, I challenged list members to identify "the most influential 
>man in the history of the American piano". No one was able to do so. I 
>wasn't surprised. First of all, it was something of a trick question 
>because its answer consisted of two names, not just one. Secondly, I knew 
>full well that 99% of the techs out there had never even heard of these 
>two men, and thus didn't have the slightest idea who they were, or what it 
>was that made them so important. In fact, that's why I asked the question 
>in the first place!
>
>(If a person's a moron, it's an accident of birth and genetics. OTOH, if 
>he's an ignoramus, the fault's entirely his own; he can't blame anyone else.)
>
>And now I'll answer my own question: The two most influential and 
>important men in the history of the American piano were William B. 
>Tremaine and his son, Harry!
>
>'What? I've never even heard of those two bozos! Is this some sort of Joke?"
>
>Hardly, William and Harry Tremain were two sides of the of the same coin, 
>both cut from the same bolt of cloth, and they shared a common goal: More 
>than a hundred years ago, their ambition was to as completely dominate the 
>piano industry as Bill Gates and Microsoft dominate the computer software 
>industry today. And the thing about the Tremaines is that they almost made 
>it. Almost. Ultimately, they were tripped up by events over which they had 
>no control and which they couldn't possibly have foreseen. Nevertheless, 
>this doesn't dim in the slightest their positively brilliant insights into 
>the marketing possibilities of a self-playing piano. That's why, whenever 
>great men and their ideas are discussed, the names of William and Harry 
>Tremaine deserve to be mentioned.
>
>To illustrate what I mean, I'm going to take you into the mind of William 
>Tremaine for a moment. FIRST PRINCIPLE: To whom does one sell a piano? 
>"Well. duh, that's an easy one. Pianos are sold to pianists and 
>pianist-wannabes."  Okay, but now consider this: To whom does one sell a 
>_self-playing_ piano? The answer is EVERYONE! In other words, William 
>Tremaine expanded his market to include every single household in the 
>country! Being able to play the piano was no longer a prerequsite for 
>owning one!That's just the beginnng; there's more. SECOND PRINCIPLE: The 
>advent of the self-playing piano rendered EVERY SINGLE HAND-PLAYED 
>INSTRUMENT _EVER_ PRODUCED as obsolete and made it a candidate for 
>replacement! Such was William's objective. Indeed, one of Tremaine's most 
>famous pieces of sales literature depicted a new self-playing piano being 
>delivered to a customer's home while at the same time, his old, 
>now-obsolete,  hand-played instrument was being taken away.
>
>There was, of course, much more to  theTremaine's Grand Strategy than just 
>this, (for example. one of their original takeover targets was the firm of 
>Steinway, itself!),  but these two principles by themselves give you an 
>idea of the scope of the their ambitions: Total domination of the piano 
>industry.
>
>"Okay, Les, you've got my attention, but who _were_ these guys?"
>
>William Tremaine was a rare and gifted visionary . In the 19th Century -- 
>long before the days of the radio, the phonograph, or even electricity! -- 
>William looked into his crystal ball and  accurately  foresaw the future 
>of the piano. He was not content, however, merely to watch it happen, he 
>was determined to make it happen, and so he did.
>
>William began by quietly buying up patent rights -- and sometimes, entire 
>companies -- relating to self-playing pianos (and organs). Finally, in 
>1887, the ground-work had been laid and he was ready to found his company. 
>Uncharacteristically, however, he did NOT name it after himself , or even 
>a piano, but after a self-playing organ.  William Tremaine called his 
>company AEOLIAN. He was its founder and first president. His son, Harry, 
>was his hand-picked successor. Between them, they set into motion forces 
>that would change the world.
>
>The lives and times of the Tremaines; the reasons behind the founding of 
>Aeolian; and a detailed accounting of that firm's first half century of 
>operations make a fascinating story. It reads like an adventure novel -- 
>albeit a tragic one -- and illustrates that then, as now, it's the lust 
>for wealth, power and glory that spurs men on to greatness. (This story 
>also puts into perspective Aeolian's final years.)
>
>Even when great men miss the mark, their failures can sometimes be 
>spectacular. So it was with the Tremaines. Athough they just barely missed 
>grapsing the brass ring, that failure touched off an industry-wide 
>meltdown of epic proportions. This is the story of what happened.
>
>
>******
>
>Although William Tremaine was the first to recognize the marketing 
>possibilities of a self-playing piano, he was not alone for very long. 
>Money makes the world go around, and as soon as the other piano 
>manufacturers grasped the huge profits to be made, they were quick to jump 
>on the Tremaine juggernaut. This had one immediate and far-reaching 
>consequence.
>
>The coming of age of the self-playing piano coincides precisely with the 
>disappearance of high- quality, hand played instruments. This is not 
>happenstance. The two are mutually exclusive. First of all, the piano was 
>now only one half of a whole, the other half being its self-playing 
>mechanism. Secondly, these instruments were now being aggressively 
>marketed to musically-ignorant, non-pianists. Consequently, many of these 
>instruments would _never_ be hand played. (One of the long standing jokes 
>to come out of the era was that a person no longer needed a good ear to 
>play the piano, just a good foot!) Manufacturers were quick to take 
>advantage of this fact by cutting piano construction costs where ever 
>possible. After all, every dollar saved was another dollar in their 
>pockets, and no one would ever know, right? Thus, when the whole era came 
>to an abrupt end, manufacturers not only lacked the financial wherewithall 
>to return to making high-quality, hand-played pianos, they had forgotten how!
>
>Because of this, the majority of the highest quality, American-built, 
>hand-played pianos date from within a very narrow time frame. It runs from 
>the Great Philadelphia Exhibition of 1876 to 1906 -- a period of only 
>thirty years! This latter date is not arbitrarily chosen. 1906 marks the 
>founding of the American Piano Company -- certainly the beginning of the 
>End. If one views William Tremaine's formation of Aeolian as the opening 
>move in a chess game for domination of the American Piano Industry, then 
>the creation of the American Piano Company may be seen as a countering, 
>defensive move in that same game. The founding of Aeolian and the APC 
>would ultimately  prove to be to the American piano what hitting the 
>iceberg was to the ocean liner Titanic. A thorough development of this 
>theme would take an entire book by itself. I'll leave that task for 
>someone else. The fact remains, however, that with the exception of 
>Steinways, Richard Gertz's Mason and Hamlins, and some early Baldwins, the 
>vast majority of hand-played pianos built during the 20th Century were 
>litle more than embarrassments to the names on their fallboards. That's 
>part of the Tremaine legacy.
>
>******
>
>
>Self-playing pianos were expensive. Even an average quality, 
>run-of-the-mill "note-knocker" cost twice as much as its hand-played-only 
>counterpart. Higher quality, more sophisticated and complex instruments 
>cost even more, sometimes a lot more. For example: only the wealthy could 
>afford a nine-foot Steinway concert grand outfitted with Aeolian's 
>top-of-the-line Dou-Art reproducing mechanism and connected to their 
>Concertola twelve station automatic roll changer! No wonder Aeolian's 
>advertising literature for this product depicted a man in his tuxedo and a 
>woman in her evening gown, seated in the mahogany-paneled drawing room of 
>their mansion,  listening to this magnificient instrument!
>
>Even today, the faultlessly performing, highly complicated preumatic 
>technology involved invites both wonder and increddulity. Imagine how it 
>must have seemed 3/4's of a century ago!
>
>******
>
>(Footnote: Because of the great expense of doing so, only the largest 
>manufacturers -- like Aeolian -- were able to tool up for and produce 
>their own self- playing mechanisms. Most piano manufacturers out-sourced 
>their self-playing mechanisms, buying them from firms like the Standard 
>Aciton Company which built nothing else. In this way, even the smallest 
>manu-facturers were able to participate in the revolution,,and the debacle 
>that ended it.)
>
>******
>
>Aeolian -- as well as all the many copycat manufacturers who had jumped 
>onto the self-playing piano band-wagon -- needed a gimmick to help them 
>sell these high-priced instruments, and they found one: they would sell 
>them on credit! Thus, for only a small downpayment and the promise to make 
>regular installment payments on the remaining balance due, a person could 
>take immediate delivery of his purchase. (Less-expensive, hand-played-only 
>pianos were also sold this way.) The idea went over like free booze at a 
>piano tuner's convention! Consequently, as the 1920's roared, the piano 
>indistry roared right along with them. Everything was proceed-ing exactly 
>as William Tremaine had foreseen. The brass ring was almost within reach. 
>What could possibly go wrong? (When things are going exceptionally well, 
>_never_  ask yourself this question!)
>
>It would be a mistake to assume that pianos were the only consumer goods 
>being sold on credit during the 1920's. They weren't. The idea of "buying 
>now and paying later" permeated every aspect of the economy. One could buy 
>virtually anything on credit -- even stocks.
>
>******
>
>The stockmarket, like an individual stock, is governed by the law of 
>supply and demand. If there are more buyers than sellers, it moves up; in 
>there are more sellers than buyers, it moves down; and if everyone is 
>selling and no one is buying, it drops like a piano falling out of a 10th 
>story window!
>
>The stockmarket of the 1920's was a highly speculative one -- it defied 
>rational analysis. A steady influx of new investors sent the market 
>soaring. It was not uncommon to see  prices of individual stocks double, 
>triple or even quadruple in a span of less than a year. This kind of 
>performance, of course, attracted even more investors, pushing the market 
>ever higher. Stock prices bore no correlation to the financial realities 
>of the underlying companies. Even if the company was a scam, had no 
>financial assets, never turned a profit and its entire board of directors 
>was on the FBI's "Most Wanted List", as long as there were more buyers 
>than sellers, its stock would continue to rise. Such as market was a very 
>dangerous place for unwary investors, and during the 1920's, they 
>abounded.  Nevertheless, for a long time it seemed as though the bubble 
>might never burst. Seemed. Then, like a perverse game of "Musical Cairs", 
>the music suddenly stopped and when investors looked around, they 
>discovered someone had hidden all the chairs, there were no seats to be 
>had, and that they were all losers.
>
>******
>
>
>When a person invested in stocks during the 1920's, he only had to put up 
>15% of their purchase price and the brokerage house would "loan" him the 
>other 85%. ( this is known as "buying on margin", a very dangerous 
>practice for the uninformed.) Thus, on a $2000 purchase, the investor only 
>had to put up $300 and the brokerage house would front him the remaining 
>$1700. Assume now that the stock doubled in price. The position was now 
>worth $4000. When the investor sold, he would pay the brokerage house back 
>the $1700 it had loaned him, and be left with $2300. He had his $300 back 
>and $2000 of pure profit! The dream of making big bucks on a small 
>investment lured droves of financially-unsophisticated  people of modest 
>means to invest in the stockmarket. When they signed their account 
>agreements, they had no idea they were committing financial suicide. They 
>would soon learn the truth , but like all of Shake-speare's tragic heroes, 
>that understanding would come too late to save them. Way too late.
>
>It always pays to read the fine print. Unfortunately, the hordes of 
>neophyte investors who flooded the stockmarket during the '20's in search 
>of '"easy money" neglected to do so. That was a fatal mistake. When the 
>clueless investor bought some stock and put up his 15%, he naively assumed 
>that the brokerage firm was loaning him 85% of the stock's PURCHASE PRICE. 
>It wasn't. It was loaning him 85% of the stock's CURRENT VALUE. There's a 
>huge difference. 85% of current value meant that as the price of the stock 
>in the investor's account fluctuated, the amount of the loan it would 
>collateralize fluctuated, too.  In other words, the size of the loan was 
>not fixed. It varied. As long as the market was rising, everything was 
>fine. As soon as the market started to decline, however, the entire 
>country was given a "crash" course in " Stock Brokerage Realities 101".
>
>Let's return to our original example. The investor had purchased  $2000 of 
>stock, put up his $300 (15%) and borrowed the other $1700 (85% of the 
>stock's CURRENT VALUE) from his brokerage firm. Now assume that the stock 
>moved down in price by 50%. The account was now worth $1000.  This dollar 
>amount of stock would only collateralize a loan of $850. (85% of its 
>current value). Therefore, the investor would receive a demand from the 
>brokerage company to immediately pay back half of the $1700 it had 
>originally loaned him (based on the stock's then current value of $2000.) 
>This is called a "Margin Call". If the investor couldn't meet this demand 
>for more money, he was in for another nasty surprise. The brokerage 
>company would sell sufficient stock in his account to cover the amount 
>owed. This is called a "Sellout" In this particular case, the firm would 
>sell all the stock in the account because the investor owed it a total of 
>$1700. When the smoke cleared, this is the situation in which the investor 
>found himselff:  He had lost his $300 investnment; his stock had been sold 
>out from under him; and he still owed the brokerage firm $700! If his 
>stock a dropped in price to zero, his situation would be even worse. He'd 
>be out his $300 inveastment; his stock was worthless; and he still owed 
>the brokerage firm the $1700 it had originally loaned him!
>
>At this point, Aunt Zerelda's habit of saving her money by putting it into 
>an old sock tucked away in the back of a dresser drawer didn't seem quite 
>so foolish!
>
>******
>
>The stockmarket crash off '29 started out as a modest decline -- just 
>enough to trigger the first round of margin calls. When these calls 
>weren't met -- and most of them weren't --  the stocks in the investor's 
>accounts were sold out. This selling, coming into an already declining 
>market, pushed it even lower. This triggered another round of margin calls 
>and sellouts; they triggered another and they triggered another, etc. In 
>short, the declining market fed on itself and what started out as a modest 
>decline turned into a rout.  When the smoke cleared, stocks had lost more 
>than  80% of their value, an amount measured in the tens of billions of 
>1929 dollars.
>
>******
>
>We remember best those lessons that cost us money and the more expensive 
>they are, the better we remember them. After the  crash of '29, people 
>stayed away from the market for decades, convinced that stockbrokers were 
>little more than crooks, thieves and con men.
>However true that might be, it's not the complete story.  The investors, 
>themselves, were partly to blame, too. In their rush to make a quick 
>killing in the market, they had let greed get in the way of good 
>judgement. There's an old Wall Sreet adage worth remembering: "Bulls and 
>Bears can make money in the market;  Pigs can't."
>
>It's unfortunate that a bull is the mascot of the country's largest 
>brokerage firm. While many people believe that it  symbolizes the firm's 
>investment philosophy, others hold that it merely represents "truth in 
>advertising"! :)
>
>******
>
>
>It's commonly assumed that the maket crash of 1929 was the cause of the 
>Great Depression. It wasn't. It was only a contributing factor. For 
>example, not all people were dumb enough to allow themselves to get sucked 
>into investing in the stockmarket.  These were prudent people who worked 
>hard for their money, knew the value of a dollar, and put it where it 
>would be safe: into a bank. So imagine their surprise when one day after 
>the stockmarket crash, they went to their bank to withdraw some money from 
>their account and discovered that its doors were padlocked shut because it 
>had gone bust! Although the idea of depositer's insurance would arise from 
>the ashes of the banking system's colllapse, it would come far too late to 
>be of any help to the crowd of angry people milling around on the sidewalk 
>outside their bank, shaking their fists -- or at least one finger! -- at 
>the institution that had betrayed their trust. Their money was gone just 
>as surely as if they had taken a market flyer on Consolidated Buggy Whips!
>
>******
>
>The strockmarket crash followed by the collapse of the nation's banking 
>system (some 5000 banks failed) dealt the economy a devastating one-two 
>punch, American's credit driven economy of the 1920's was essentially a 
>huge pyramid scheme. Its sustainabilty was predicated upon the necessity 
>that  consumers keep making  regular payments on their installment loans. 
>Suddenly, they were unable to do so.  Moreover, they didn't have any money 
>to purchase new goods either. This brought the whole house of cards 
>tumbling down. The economy came to a standstill. Massive layoffs ensued 
>and many factories closed their doors forever. The unthinkable had happened,
>
>All throughout the decade, the people had been payiing for the present by 
>mortgaging their tomorrows and had thought the note would never come due. 
>They were wrong. When the dust from the economic collapse had settled, 
>they discovered Snidely Whiplash standing amidst the ruins of their lives, 
>mortgage note in hand, demanding his money, and the people had no way of 
>paying him. No way at all..   At that moment, the world changed forever. 
>The past was irretrievably lost and the future was an impenetrable enigma. 
>What would become of the people now? What would they do? No one had the 
>answers the people sought, but some lied and said that they did. Chief 
>among those liars was a man named Franklin Delano Roosevelt... (Ralph 
>Martin would have loved this part!)
>
>******
>
>
>During the 1920's, one could buy a self-playing piano for as lttle as 10% 
>down and finance the remaining 90%. For a while, this certainly moved the 
>goods. Unfortunately, no one ever gave any thought to what would happen if 
>all the purchasers defaulted on their loans at the same time and they (the 
>loans) suddenly became uncollectable. That's exactly what happened. The 
>effect was the same as if the manufacturers had been holding 
>a  decade-long going-out-of-business- sale, liquidating their instruments 
>for 10 cents on the dollar: i.e. selling a $600 oiano for $60. a $1500 
>piano for $150; etc. The financial losses were staggering and their 
>effect, catastrophic. Like a herd of stampeeding cattle blindly following 
>its leader over the edge of a cliff to certain death, the entire piano 
>industry followed Aeolian over the brink of a bottomless abyss.
>
>Although no one was aware of it at the time, the entire piano industry had 
>suffered a mortal blow. It would take another fifty years  to finish 
>driving all the nails into the lid of its coffin, but by the time that 
>happened, they were merely burying a decades-old corpse and there were no 
>mourners at its funeral. The industry's epitaph? Rust In Peace. That is 
>William and Harry Tremaine's ultimate legacy and the reason why they are 
>so important to the history of the American piano.
>
>(Footnote:  A few players have been made in modern times, but they were 
>merely echoes of a long-distant past. The Tremaines did it first, and no 
>one ever did it any better. Not ever.)
>
>
>******
>
>"After the economic collapse, why didn't manufacturers just return to 
>making regular, hand-
>played instruments?"
>
>They couldn't. The financial devastation was just too great. Leaf through 
>the pages of your piano atlas and you can read the death notices of all 
>the firms that didn't make it. Some companies did survive, of course, 
>chief among them, Aeolian, itself, but it was only a ghost of its former 
>self. Its glory days were gone forever. Aeolian (and the other survivors) 
>would spend the next five decades building increasingly inferior pianos. 
>The reason for this is not difficult to understand: there were few buyers, 
>not even for poor quality, cheaply made instruments.
>
>The Great Depression lasted all throughout the 1930's and into the early 
>'40's. All this time, the people were waiting for Roosevelt to make good 
>on his promises to revive the economy and to bring about full employment, 
>but he never did, He had lied. The New Deal turned out to be The Raw Deal. 
>Consequently, although the people had plenty of time on their hands, they 
>had no money in their pockets to buy pianos.
>
>The Nation's entry in World War ll did for the economy what Roosevelt, 
>hinself, could not: it got it going again..  The men all went off to fight 
>the war and the women entered the work force, taking over those jobs in 
>industry that had traditionally had held by men. With everyone involved in 
>the war effort, however, no one had time for pianos.
>
>When the men came home after winning the war, they discovered America had 
>changed. The Depression was finally over; the economy was humming along 
>and jobs were plentiful. Most importantly for our purposes, however, there 
>was soon to be a vast array of dazzling new consumer goods competing for 
>their dollars. Pianos weren't even on the list.
>
>Radio had come into its own during the '30's and 40's, but would soon be 
>upstaged by a new kid on the block. Late in the decade, RCA introduced an 
>invention that would transform the world: television. Sales boomed all 
>throughout the '50's and then, just when it seemed the saturation point 
>was being reached, color television was introduced in 1960. This rekindled 
>the buying frenzy as everyone scrambled to replace their now-obsolete 
>Black & White sets with  color ones.
>
>The war now over, new cars were once again in production. At the same 
>time, the Federal Government built an elaborate system of modern highways 
>crisscrossing and unifying the entire nation. Because of these two 
>factors, we were now a highly mobile and interconnected society.
>
>In the 1950's, the big band sound of the '30's and '40's was replaced with 
>something new:
>Rock n Roll. Soon the music of performers like Chuck Berry, Buddy Holly, 
>Flvis Presley, Fats Domino, Johnny Cash, Jerry Lee Lewis and Carl Perkins 
>was blaring from the speakers of radios, juke boxes and 45 rpm record 
>players all across the country.  Hi-Fi was introduced in the '50's, 
>stereo, several years later.
>
>And then, in the 1960's, America suffered two notable foreign invasions: 
>the first was by a British music group called "The Beatles"; the second 
>was by a Japanese piano with a strange sounding name: Yamaha. (Properly 
>pronounced, the enphasis is on he second syllable:
>ya-MA-ha.) Japan had lost one war, but it would win this one.
>
>During the post war era, although the people had both the time and the 
>money for pianos, they had little desire for them. Once such an important 
>part of America's economy and culture, as the 20th Century progressed, the 
>piano became increasing irrelevant to both. What had happened? Simply put: 
>the World had changed. Again.
>
>******
>
>'What about Steinway? It Still exists."
>
>The "Instrument of the Immortals" is just as dead as they all are, and has 
>been for some time. If you're reading this essay, I assume you can 
>"connect the dots" for yourself, but I'll give you an example of what I 
>mean. Early Steinways were so good that even Franz Liszt, himself, -- he 
>died in 1886 --had an American-built Steinway upright in his teaching 
>studio at Weimar. He got this piano (as well as a second one!) courtesy of 
>Richard Gertz's father who was a supplier of fine-quality pianos to the 
>European concert tarde (Brahms, Wagner, etc). That was a long time ago. 
>Things have changed.
>
>Take a modern Steinway upright, remove its top board and look inside.  Do 
>you notice anything missing? You know, like its entire action!!!!! What's 
>happened to those vaunted, tubular metal action rails; those snazzy, 
>"signature" flanges; and all those other proprietary action parts that 
>once made a Steinway a Steinway and could be found on no other piano in 
>the world? That's just the beginning. Try playing even a moderately 
>difficult Lisztian composition -- like the Concert Etude in Db (Un 
>Suspiro), or the first movement of the Sixth Hungarian Rhapsody -- on this 
>instrument and you'll quickly discover why if Franz Liszt were alive 
>today, it's an _absolute certainty_ that he would NOT have a modern 
>Steinway upright in his Studio!
>
>If you're unable to understand any of this, reread the second paragraph of 
>this essay.
>
>
>******
>
>And what of Today's piano technician? He, himself, is little more than a 
>gray-bearded anachronism, a cob-webbed relic from the distant past. For 
>all his relevancy to the modern world, he might just as well be working on 
>Model-T automobiles; crystal radios; clockwork mechanism, Victrola record 
>players; vacuum-tube, black & white television sets; or hula-hoops.
>It turns out that Barney isn't the last surviving dinosaur. He has plenty 
>of company.
>
>
>CONCLUSION
>
>There is a lesson to be learned in all this and it's an important one: The 
>one constant in life is change. The world is in a perpetual state of flux 
>and no matter how permanent something may appear to be, the sad truth is 
>that nothing lasts. Nothing.
>
>Expressing this a little more poetically:
>
>For everything there is a time, but once that time has passed -- however
>much you might wish otherwise -- it's gone forever.
>
>
>
>To put this all into perspective for you, I'll conclude by posing a 
>heart-breaking question Newton Hunt asked me not long before he died:
>
>'Whatever happened to Yesterday, Les? Where did it go?"
>
>Lately, I've been wondering the same thing.
>
>Les Smith
>
>
>copyright 2003
>Les Smith
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>The people were paying for the present by mortgaging their tomorrows, and 
>they thought the note would never come due. They were wrong.
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Conrad Hoffsommer - Music Technician
Luther College, 700 College Dr., Decorah, Iowa 52101-1045
Vox-(563)-387-1204 // Fax (563)-387-1076

- Education is what you get from reading the small print. Experience is 
what you get from not reading it.


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